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Notes
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS-COMMUNITY LIABILITY FOR WIFE's TORTS
Defendant wife negligently caused an accident while using
the family car for the purpose of borrowing a knitting needle to
knit herself a sweater. Held, defendant husband was liable in
solido with his wife. Brantley v. Clarkson, 217 La. 425, 46 So. 2d
614 (1950).
In so holding the supreme court modified the doctrine of
Adams v. Golson,1 which the court of appeal had reluctantly fol-
lowed. 2 In Adams v. Golson the wife's accident occurred while
she was on her way to her evening meal after having attended a
style show and before attending a social meeting. It was decided
that the wife's trip was for her own pleasure and benefit.3 The
court concluded that such a trip was not a community errand 4
and so did not hold the husband liable in solido with his wife.
Under Adams v. Golson the wife could utilize the family car
and negligently cause an accident, in which case the victim would
go uncompensated unless the wife had separate property; yet
the wife could continue living in the comfort of the untouched
community wealth.
The principal case has eliminated such an undesirable situa-
tion. The supreme court has now decided that the community
owes the wife recreation, enjoyment and pleasure as well as food
and clothes and that the former are to be considered within the
scope of community affairs. Perhaps the court best explained
itself for this change when it quoted from the court of appeal
opinion as follows: ". . . the legitimate pursuits of the wife
whether for wholesome recreation and pleasure or for other pur-
poses consonant with the intangible and imponderable obliga-
1. 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
2. Brantley v. Clarkson, 39 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 1948).
3. The evening meal, which apparently was within the scope of com-
munity affairs, was deemed merely incidental to the wife's trip.
4. Briefly, the rationale in Adams v. Golson is that even though the hus-
band is not generally liable for his wife's torts he may be held for her negli-
gent driving under a theory of agency, that is, when a wife uses the family
car for community affairs with her husband's authorization, she is an agent
of the community and therefore the husband, as head and master of the
community, is responsible for her negligent driving.
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tions of the marital relationship should be considered as within
the scope of community activities."5
The courts will no longer be required to deal with the ques-
tion of what errands of the wife are of such benefit to the com-
munity as to come within the scope of community affairs under
the criteria of Adams v. Golson.6 Neither will the courts have to
tangle with the question of just what was the wife's primary
purpose where her purposes were several."
Furthermore, sound public policy demands solvency behind
automobile operators. The decision in the principal case is in
accord with that policy.
William A. L. Crowe
PARTY IN DEFAULT-RIGHT TO PERFORM
A contract to sell real estate contained the provision, "pos-
session to be given at act of sale." When the vendors failed to
deliver the keys at the time set for the passage of the act of
sale, purchaser sued for the return of twice his deposit. Held,
recovery was allowed; defendants had breached the contract by
not delivering the keys at the proper time. Matthews v. Gaubler,
49 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 1951).1
According to the rule laid down in Southport Mills v. Ansley, 2
in a commutative contract other than a completed sale of real
estate, the delinquent party, while unable to perform of right
after default, may nevertheless do so if the court, in its discretion,
will allow performance.3 This rule is based upon a literal inter-
5. See Brantley v. Clarkson, 39 So. 2d 617, 620 (La. App. 1948).
6. (a) Errands were within the scope of community affairs: Meibaum v.
Campist, 16 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1944) (wife's trip to have coffee table
repaired); Levy v. New Orleans & Northeastern R.R., 20 So. 2d 559 (La.
App. 1945) (wife's trip to dressmaker).
(b) Errands were not within the scope of community affairs: Matulich
v. Crockett, 184 So. 748 (La. App. 1938) (wife's trip for charitable works);
Wise v. Smith, 186 So. 857 (La. App. 1939) (wife's visit to sick mother-in-law);
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Simms, 200 So. 34 (La. App. 1941) (wife's
visit to sick aunt).
All of these cases have relied on Adams v. Golson.
7. See Meibaum v. Campisi, 16 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1944), for one example
of difficulty in determining wife's primary purpose.
1. "In commutative contracts, where the reciprocal obligations are to be
performed at the same time, or the one immediately after the other, the
party who wishes to put the other in default, must, at the time and place
expressed in, or implied by the agreement, offer or perform, as the contract
requires, that which on his part was to be performed, otherwise the opposite
party will not be legally put in default."
2. 160 La. 131, 106 So. 720 (1925).
3. See also Art. 2047, La. Civil Code of 1870.
